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Abstract Bioethical debates on the use of human embry-
os and oocytes for stem cell research have often been
criticized for the lack of empirical insights into the percep-
tions and experiences of the women and couples who are
asked to donate these tissues in the IVF clinic. Empirical
studies that have investigated the attitudes of IVF patients
and citizens on the (potential) donation of their embryos
and oocytes have been scarce and have focused predom-
inantly on the situation in Europe and Australia. This
article examines the viewpoints on the donation of embry-
os for stem cell research among IVF patients and students
in China. Research into the perceptions of patients is based
on in-depth interviews with IVF patients and IVF clini-
cians. Research into the attitudes of students is based on a
quantitative survey study (n=427). The empirical findings
in this paper indicate that perceptions of the donation of
human embryos for stem cell research in China are far
more diverse and complex than has commonly been sug-
gested. Claims that ethical concerns regarding the donation
and use of embryos and oocytes for stem cell research are
typical for Western societies but absent in China cannot be
upheld. The article shows that research into the situated
perceptions and cultural specificities of human tissue do-
nation can play a crucial role in the deconstruction of
politicized bioethical argumentation and the (often ill-
informed) assumptions about Bothers^ that underlie
socio-ethical debates on themoral dilemmas of technology
developments in the life sciences.
Keywords Embryo donation . IVF stem cell interface .
hESCR, human germ line editing . China
Introduction
The donation and use of human embryos and oocytes
for research purposes has, over the last twenty years,
sparked off widespread ethical debates at a global scale.
Many of these controversies have focused on the use of
these tissues for human embryonic stem cell (hESC)
research, which involves the destruction of human em-
bryos and the redirecting of their biological potential for
scientific, medical, and commercial purposes. Since
2007, however, with the invention of induced pluripo-
tent stem (iPS) cells, which allows the creation of plu-
ripotent cells in an ethically less controversial way,
debates regarding hESC have become gradually less
pronounced. A widespread belief at that time was that
fewer and fewer human oocytes and embryos would be
needed and that the use of iPS cells (which can be
generated from human somatic cells) would gradually
replace the significance of hESC. In the last ten years,
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though, the use of hESC has remained important, which
is reflected in various clinical trials and a continuing
stream of publications that present findings from basic
and preclinical research. Moreover, with the creation of
the first hESC line from somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT) in 2013 (Tachibana et al. 2013), and more
recently the use of human embryos for human germ line
editing (Liang et al. 2015), the demand for human
oocytes and embryos has once again increased.
An important aspect of the public and political con-
troversies that have surrounded the use of human repro-
ductive tissues for research, is that these debates have
focused primarily on the moral, ontological, and reli-
gious status of human oocytes and embryos. They have
mostly ignored the perceptions and crucial role played
by women and couples in bringing these reproductive
tissues into existence (Dickenson 2006) and the ways in
which they are embedded in the wider social network of
the family and community (Waldby 2008). Women and
couples undergoing IVF treatment are the key providers
of the Bbiological rawmaterials^ that enable these forms
of research and potential clinical applications. Sarah
Franklin has in this respect introduced the term BIVF–
Stem Cell Interface,^ because the IVF clinic is the nexus
that connects the intimate life worlds of IVF patients
with the interests of stem cell researchers and the wider
bio-economy (Franklin 2006). In contrast to the dona-
tion of sperm, the induced maturation and removal of
oocytes in the IVF clinic is a risky process that is
demanding from both a physical and an emotional per-
spective. It involves long-drawn-out regimes of medical
examination and drug administering and finishes in a
dicey surgical procedure. It is this demanding process of
Bwomen’s reproductive labor^ (Cooper and Waldby
2014) that forms the vital core of an evolving biological
economy which lies at the heart of the medical, scien-
tific, and commercial benefits that the use of donated
human reproductive tissues enables.
This under-communication of the role of women in
public debates and of the bodily labour involved in
hESC, SCNT, and germ line editing research, has given
rise to questions about reciprocity, justice, and exploita-
tion, with regard to the ways in which these tissues are
sourced, circulated, and banked, and transformed into
medical, scientific, and capital value (Franklin 2006;
Parry 2005; Sleeboom-Faulkner 2014). One of the key
questions that has emerged is whether there exists a
balance between the value these tissues gain and the
value they have for the persons who donate them and
also whether there should be any form of payment or
financial compensation for donors (Cooper and Waldby
2014).
Empirical research that has focused on the attitudes
and actual experiences of embryo and oocyte donors for
stem cell research has been rare. Virtually all of these
studies have focused on the situation in Western socie-
ties, in particular the United Kingdom (Haimes et al.
2008), Denmark (Svendsen and Koch 2008), Switzer-
land (Scully et al. 2012), Germany (Krones et al. 2006),
and Australia (Waldby and Carroll 2012). Empirical
studies that examine the views of embryo or oocyte
donors regarding stem cell research outside of Western
Europe, the United States, and Australia have been
extremely scarce. Research has been conducted on the
sociocultural meanings of embryos among IVF patients
in Japan (Kato and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2011), India
(Gupta 2011), and China (Mitzkat, Haimes and
Rehmann-Sutter 2010; Jin et al. 2013).
Focus of Article and Key Findings
This article focuses on the attitudes, perceptions, and
experiences of IVF patients in China regarding embryo
donation for stem cell research. The paper also presents
findings from a survey on the donation of human embry-
os for stem cell research that was carried out among
Chinese students. There are two existing studies on em-
bryo donation in Chinese IVF clinics. The first study,
published by Chinese IVF clinicians (Jin et al. 2013),
showed that the willingness among a sample of 386 IVF
patients to donate embryos for stem cell researchwas low.
The study cited lack of information on research purposes
and distrust in science as the most important reasons for
patients’ refusal. The second paper, by Mitzkat, Haimes,
and Rehmann-Sutter (2010), whichwas based on a small-
scale pilot study with five IVF patients, indicated that
there was a widespread lack of understanding among
women who were asked to donate their embryos for
research. This study raised important questions about
the handling of informed consent procedures.
In contrast to these two studies, this article engages in
greater depth with the sociocultural frameworks that
underpin processes of embryo donation in China. It
also examines the ways in which the situated percep-
tions and attitudes of embryo donors are at odds with
both bioethical discourse in China and the commentary
of international observers. The paper shows that
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empirical evidence can play a crucial role in
deconstructing politicized forms of bioethical argumen-
tation and the (often speculative) assumptions about
Bothers^ that inform socio-ethical debates on the impact
and moral dilemmas of technology developments in the
life sciences.
The article illustrates that the attitudes and values on
the donation of human oocytes and embryos in China
are more diverse than has commonly been suggested.
Chinese bioethicists, scientists, and regulators have re-
peatedly claimed that the donation of human oocytes
and embryos does not constitute a problem for IVF
patients in China. The bioethicist Renzong Qiu, for
example, has argued that as a result of Confucian views
many people in China presume that a person comes into
being only at the moment of birth (Qiu 2007). This view
has also been reiterated in interviews with Chinese stem
cell scientists (Mann 2003; Sleeboom-Faulkner 2010).
Another regularly expressed assumption among re-
searchers in China is that because the country’s socialist
government has for decades promoted atheism, reli-
gious concerns are by and large absent in Chinese
society (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2010). The stem cell scien-
tist Yang Xiangzhong has suggested that for these rea-
sons BChina has a cultural environment with fewer
moral objections to the use of embryonic stem cells than
many Western countries^ (Yang 2004). Another widely
held view is that unborn forms of human life in China
are generally valued low because of the country’s family
planning policies and the high number of abortions
carried out during the last three decades (Cookson
2005). As pointed out by the demographer Yaqiang
Qi: Babortion, which destroys embryos [and fetuses],
has never been seen as wrong in Chinese society^ (Qi,
quoted in Mann 2003). While this statement is inaccu-
rate from a historical perspective, as we will show in this
paper, it is true that many commentators have assumed
that China’s birth politics has created a cultural environ-
ment in which unborn forms of human life are generally
devalued and dehumanized and that therefore the pro-
curement and use of human embryos and fetuses for
research is unproblematic (Mann 2003; Cookson 2005;
Klein 2010). But China’s birth policy is also seen as
conducive to the procuring of embryos for another rea-
son: because the policy does not allow IVF patients to
have more than one baby (since 2015, two babies),
leftover embryos can no longer be used for pregnancy,
and this increases the likelihood of their donation for
research (Klein 2010).
While it is difficult to say in which ways exactly the
sociocultural impact of the population policy has influ-
enced attitudes and donation practices of human embry-
os in China, it is safe to argue—in the light of the
empirical data we present in this article— that the above
views and arguments are simplistic and often mislead-
ing. The findings from our survey and the in-depth
interviews among IVF patients indicate that oocytes
and embryos that are created in the context of IVF are
entangled in a rich web of meanings, conceptions of
value, values, emotions, concerns and social relations.
This makes the question to donate these tissues for
research often a difficult and highly personal decision.
In the light of these findings, it is not surprising that a
predominant number of IVF patients in China refuse to
donate their spare embryos and oocytes for research.
The empirical sections of this article are structured in
three parts. In part one, we conduct a brief literature
review that introduces the key characteristics of valua-
tion of early life forms in China. In part two, we present
the findings from our survey study that was conducted
among Chinese students. In part three, we present the
data from our interviews with IVF patients, as well as
findings from interviews with IVF clinicians and stem
cell researchers. The article concludes that there is a
need for more in-depth research into practices surround-
ing donation of human gametes, zygotes, embryos, and
other body tissues in both developing countries and
scientifically more advanced countries. Donation prac-
tices and corresponding regulations must be informed
by these situated perspectives and the moral and social
dilemmas that underlie the donation, use, and commer-
cialization of human oocytes and embryos.
Method
The data presented in this article are based on two inter-
related studies that examined the attitudes towards the
donation of human embryos for stem cell research in
China. The first study involved in-depth interviews with
fifteen IVF patients (twelve female and three male) and
fifteen IVF clinicians from three IVF clinics in South-
east and Central China. The data were collected in
February and March 2008. The interviews with IVF
patients were conducted together with a translator who
helped when needed. The interviews were recorded, and
informed consent was obtained to use excerpts in social
science publications. The quotations that are presented
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in this text are based on the transcription and translation
of the audio recordings. The second study is a quantita-
tive survey that was conducted in March 2008 of 427
students from two large universities in Wuhan, Central
China. Of these, 250 respondents were female and 177
were male. Four hundred and nine students were com-
pleting an undergraduate degree (237 female and 172
male), and eighteen students were completing a post-
graduate (master’s) degree (thirteen female and five
male). Aside from gaining a general overview of our
respondents’ attitudes on embryo donation for hESC
research, we aimed to examine whether there were
differences between male and female students as well
as between medicine and non-medicine students. Our
assumptionwas that medicine students hadmore knowl-
edge of the characteristics and possible benefits of hu-
man embryonic stem cell research and that for this
reason their attitudes might be more supportive com-
pared to students from a non-medical study background.
For this reason, we distributed our survey among stu-
dents in the medical faculties of the two universities in
which the survey was conducted and among students
from a varied (non-medical) study background. Alto-
gether, 227 respondents were enrolled in a medical
degree programme (165 female and 92 male) and 170
students were enrolled in a (non-medical) study pro-
gramme (85 female and 85 male). Respondents from
non-medical disciplinary backgrounds included stu-
dents from the natural sciences, humanities, social sci-
ences, and business studies. Because the sample sizes of
these divergent student groups were too small for sys-
tematic comparisons, we collapsed all non-medical stu-
dents into a single category and solely compared the
views of medical students with the views of non-
medical students. We distributed our questionnaires to
students in lecture halls at the end of lectures after
obtaining permission from professors and teaching staff
and in the reading rooms of the two universities’ main
libraries.
We have selected university students for a variety of
reasons. First, access to students is easier to negotiate
than a broader segment of the public, which would have
required permissions from multiple institutions and
work units. Second, the financial budget for this re-
search was limited. For monetary and organizational
reasons, a survey among a more representative subset
of the Chinese population was not possible. Third, stu-
dents can be expected to have a sufficient knowledge
basis to answer the questionnaire. This is not necessarily
the case for other segments of China’s population. Es-
pecially, older people and persons with a low education-
al background would possibly have struggled with the
questionnaire. Another reason is that students are the
future leaders and workforce of contemporary societies,
whose lives and reproductive decisions are likely to be
affected by the availability of artificial reproductive
technologies and regenerative medicine. Their ideas
and attitudes are relevant to ethicists, policymakers,
and academic discourse.
Clearly, university students are not typical of the
public of large. Moreover, because the survey includes
data from a relatively small set of students, from only
two universities in one city, representativeness of the
student population in China as a whole is limited.
Generalization to a larger sample of students or
the wider public must be made with caution. An-
other limitation of this study is that students are
asked to consider a hypothetical situation, but their
way of thinking when answering the survey does
not necessarily correspond with their actions and
reasoning were that situation to really happen. The
validity of the survey data in relation to actual
practices may therefore be low. To mitigate this
problem, we present in this article first of all the
findings from the survey and then continue with
the findings from our qualitative study, where we
present the views of IVF patients towards embryo
donation (where the option to donate embryos was
no longer hypothetical but very real). The survey has
been co-designed by the first and second author of this
paper. The survey explained the purposes of and pros-
pects for the use of IVF embryos for human embryonic
stem cell (hESC) research in written form on the first
page of the survey form. This introduction also stated
that donated embryos would be destroyed and would no
longer be used for reproductive purposes. The survey
questions explored attitudes regarding the use of
embryos and oocytes for stem cell research, as
well as corresponding values and beliefs. The
questionnaire included multiple-choice and open-
ended questions to which respondents were asked
to provide handwritten comments. Two hundred
and twenty survey participants provided handwritten
comments and explanations of their viewpoints. These
comments were translated from Mandarin Chinese to
English by translators in China. Data analysis involved
simple descriptive statistics and was carried out
with SPSS 22.
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Embryo and Oocyte Donation for Stem Cell
Research in China
The procurement of human embryos for stem cell re-
search in China is regulated in line with international
standards adopted in most high-income countries. Chi-
nese regulatory guidelines require that IVF clinics set up
ethics committees and that these committees approve
the donation of human embryos for research. Embryo
donation must be voluntary and be based on informed
consent. Hormonal super-stimulation to increase the
harvest of oocytes during an IVF cycle is forbidden.
Also, in contrast to the United States, the buying or
selling of human oocytes is banned. Moreover, as in
most countries, human embryos cannot be used for the
derivation of hESC after fourteen days post-conception.
Violations of these rules can be legally prosecuted, and
IVF clinics and individual doctors can lose their licenses
(Warrell 2009). Also, with regard to the donation and
use of human embryos for human germ line editing
research, as Zhai, Ng, and Lie (2016) have pointed
out, no major regulatory differences between China
and other scientifically advanced countries exist. Genet-
ic modification of human gametes, zygotes, and embry-
os for reproductive purposes is prohibited but can be
allowed for research purposes under certain conditions.
Despite these similarities at the level of formal regula-
tory frameworks, there are several contextual factors
that are specific to China and which are likely to influ-
ence the attitudes, perceptions, and experiences of Chi-
nese embryo donors. The first factor is that there have
been problems with the enforcement of regulatory
frameworks in other areas of the biosciences. In clinical
stem cell research, for instance, problems with the im-
plementation of regulatory provisions have resulted in
uncontrolled interventions that have been offered on a
for-profit basis (Sui and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2015). Al-
so, regarding the implementation of hESC research,
various challenges have been reported. Zhai (2007),
for instance, has mentioned that, due to the absence of
a registration and licensing infrastructure for researchers
that conduct hESC research, consistent controls of eth-
ical standards for hESC research are difficult to realize.
The enforcement of reliable controls is complicated
especially because of the large territory of China and
the high number of research institutions. The second
factor concerns the changing role of religion in Chinese
society. Under communist rule, in particular in the Mao-
ist period but also during the post-reform era, religious
practices and beliefs have often been actively sup-
pressed (Potter 2003). As reported by Sleeboom-
Faulkner and Patra (2008), due to the (assumed) secular
nature of Chinese society, it was repeatedly claimed that
the religious scruples that characterized public and po-
litical debates in the United States and many European
societies would not exist in China. In recent years,
however, religious controls have partially loosened,
and a variety of different religious traditions have been
revived or newly introduced into Chinese society
(Marsh 2011). Religious perceptions, as well as values
and norms from more Btraditional^ folk beliefs, are thus
likely to play a more important role for embryos donors
than is commonly suggested. The third factor is that
Chinese citizens have experienced three decades of
population policy, in which the female body has been
the locus of state-directed reproductive control and in-
tervention. However, with regard to the sourcing of
human embryos and gametes, concerns that similar
forms of state-induced pressure might be exerted on
women or IVF couples (Cookson 2005) have clearly
proven wrong (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2014). Neverthe-
less, there is reason to believe that China’s population
policy is influencing women’s and couple’s perceptions
of the value of their oocytes and embryos. Mitzkat,
Haimes, and Rehmann-Sutter (2010) have suggested,
that due to the one-child policy the practical significance
of Bspare^ embryos disappears once a baby has been
born and that this may increase the willingness to donate
embryos for research. However, with the recent change
of China’s population policy from a one-child to a two-
child policy, the legal situation for IVF patients has once
again changed. Thousands of (frozen) embryos have
suddenly become legally available for IVF couples to
have a second child (Wahlberg 2016).
Bioethical Perspectives on Unborn Human Life
in China
There is no cultural consensus or single bioethical view
on the use, donation, and destruction of human embryos
and fetuses in China. With regard to the use of embryos
for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, bio-
ethicists in China have, since the early 2000s, called for
reliable standards and the adoption of the bioethical
principles of autonomy and informed consent, including
the right to refuse embryo, oocyte, and sperm donation
for research and the recognition that IVF patients are the
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legal owners of their embryos and gametes (Doering
2004; Cheng et al. 2006). However, divergent view-
points exist with regard to the ways in which the per-
spectives of IVF patients (as potential donors for stem
cell research) have been represented and problematized.
Confucian-Based Interpretations
The influential bioethicist Renzong Qiu, for example,
has stated that due to its status as a potential human
being the embryo deserves due respect and that the
interests and position of possible embryo donors must
be well protected by regulatory safeguards (2007).
However, according to Qiu there are fewer moral obsta-
cles to the donation of human embryos for research in
China than in Western and especially Christian societies
(2007), where the embryo is often already seen as the
carrier of a soul or spirit (Walters 2004). A central reason
Qiu cites for this is the cultural influence of Confucian
moral philosophy. The ethicist Yanguang Wang, a col-
league of Qiu, summarized his position as follows
(Wang 2003):
According to the accepted Confucian view, a per-
son begins with birth. A person is an entity that
has a body or shape and psyche, and has rational,
emotional and social–relational capacity. So a hu-
man embryo is not a person, a personal life.
Destroying an embryo as well as an abortion
should not be taken as killing a person. However,
a human embryo is a human biological life, not
merely stuff, like a placenta. So it deserves due
respect. If there is no sufficient reason, it won’t be
permissive to manipulate or destroy it. Saving a
great number of human personal lives can be a
sufficient reason.
Hence, for Qiu, in line with Confucian reasoning, a
fetus acquires personhood only with birth. The unborn
embryo or fetus is not yet a person or a personal life, and
its use for research is justified, provided there is suffi-
cient reason. The therapeutic potential of hESC research
is seen to be such a reason. Another explanation of
Confucian notions of personhood has been provided
by the ethicist Edwin Hui (2003). According to Hui,
from a Confucian perspective, personhood is acquired
gradually through social practice. It is thus not an innate
or given property but develops over time through so-
cialization and an individual’s social relations with the
family and society (Hui 2003; see also Klein 2010).
According to Qiu, this view has important implications
for bioethical interpretations of the beginning of life and
the value of unborn life. If being a person begins at birth,
and personhood is acquired gradually through social
behaviour, the value of unborn human life, especially
at its initial stages, is low and less worthy of protection.
It is a form of human biological life but not yet a person,
and the destruction of a human embryo should not be
taken as killing a life (Qiu 2004). According to Qiu, this
is a widely held view in China and a central reason why
IVF patients (in their role as potential embryo donors)
can be expected to have less moral scruples or objec-
tions to the donation and use of their embryos for stem
cell research (Qiu 2007; cf. Klein 2010). Yali Cong, a
bioethicist from Peking University’s Health Science
Centre and a former student of Qiu, reaches a similar
conclusion. Cong (2008, 23–24) argues that:
[From] the mainstream of Chinese culture, that is,
the tradition of Confucianism, the life of a person
can be divided into two aspects: biological life and
social life. Biological life does not have an inner
character of Bsacredness^, as the classical Confu-
cian philosopher Xun Zi argued: the reason a
person can be treated as a person is because he
has yi (righteousness); otherwise, there is no dif-
ference between people and animals. […] The
idea of social and moral life is so strong that
people don’t take human biological life too seri-
ously, let alone the embryo, or even the infant just
after birth.
A related point is that, according to Cong, from the
perspective of many people in China, Blife comes from
the parents, not from God.^ As she points out:
This is the main reason individual persons, espe-
cially children, do not have a great deal of room
for independence. Accordingly, parents have the
right to make decisions for their children, even the
right to decide about life. Thus, there is no obsta-
cle for a woman who wants to stop her pregnancy,
especially within the first three months. (Cong
2008, 25).
A practical problem with this view, and also with the
arguments of Qiu and Hui above, is that these statements
are primarily based on philosophical reasoning rather
than systematic social science enquiries among Chinese
citizens. As also stated above, a survey study by a team
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of IVF clinicians amongst almost four hundred IVF
patients found that more than half (58.8 per cent) of all
respondents indicated that they would refuse donation
of their embryos for hESC research. A group around the
Shanghai-based bioethicist and policymaker Chingli Hu
arrived at similar conclusions. Based on interviews with
religious and women’s organizations in China, this team
concluded that a significant group of interviewees
expressed moral concerns regarding the use of IVF
embryos for hESC research (Hu 2009). These findings
cast doubts on the Confucian-based argument that peo-
ple in China generally consider the value of unborn
human life low, and they indicate the need for more
systematic empirical research, especially regarding the
perceptions of women and couples undergoing IVF.
Bioethical Views on Abortion and the One-Child Policy
Another crucial issue in identifying the characteristics of
the valuation of unborn human life forms in China is the
extent to which, and the ways in which, perceptions of
the use of embryos for hESC have been influenced by
the legislation, discourse, and the large number of abor-
tions that have been conducted under China’s popula-
tion policy. As stated above, various authors (Mann
2003; Cookson 2005; Klein 2010) have suggested that
the cultural environment created by China’s restrictive
birth politics has significantly influenced public atti-
tudes and ideas on the procuration and use of embryos
for hESC research.
Bioethical positions in China have generally en-
dorsed the population policy. In line with the policy’s
rationale, the large number of abortions that were con-
ducted in the context of the policy were seen as justified
for the common good, as overpopulation and rapid
population growth in China threatened the whole soci-
ety (Jiang and Liu 2016). Nonetheless, bioethicists such
as Renzong Qiu have repeatedly pointed to some of the
problematic aspects of the one-child policy, such as sex-
selective abortion and the lack of systematic controls on
policy implementation at the level of villages and towns
(Nie 2011). Despite the widespread support for abortion
under the one-child policy, it would be misleading to
assume, as the demographer Yaqiang Qi (referred to
already above) has claimed, that Babortion […] has
never been seen as wrong in Chinese society^ (Qi
quoted in Mann 2003). This is not true. During both
the late Qing Dynasty (from c. 1880–1911) and the
Republican years of China (1912–1947) abortion was
prohibited, criminalized, and in some provinces equated
with killing (Long 2012). The eminent ethical scholar of
the Republican period, Guobing Song, suggested in
1933 that Bthe human fetus from the moment of its
formation has its life and human rights, and the entitle-
ment to be protected^ [tai’er zi jie tai yihou, ji you qi
shengming yu renquan, qie you qi baozhang shengming
zhi quanli] (Song 1933, in Long 2012, 98).
While abortions were still carried out during this time,
most abortions were conducted secretly, and physicians
worked under the risk of being criminally convicted
(Long 2012). Abortion only became legal after the foun-
dation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 when
they were allowed as a part of family planning on a
voluntary basis and since the 1980s as a central element
of the country’s one-child policy (1980–2015). Accord-
ing to China’s Ministry of Health, reportedly 336 million
abortions have been conducted in China since 1971, the
majority on account of the one-child policy (Moore
2013). Since the early 2000s, an increasingly critical
body of bioethical literature has emerged on China’s birth
politics. These studies have pointed in particular to the
individual and social suffering caused by the policy. This
is best epitomized by the bioethicist and social scientist
Jingbao Nie’s study Behind the Silence. As Nie states:
Bthe one-child policy and the application of the authori-
tarian model have instead caused massive suffering to
Chinese people, especially women, and made them vic-
tims to state violence^ (Nie 2005). The awareness of the
human cost of the policy, together with the reduction of
China’s birth rate and a rapidly ageing society, have
resulted in the gradual softening of the policy in recent
years and in the transition towards a two-child policy
since January 1, 2016 (Tian 2015). In legislation, unborn
human life (up to the later stages of fetal development)
was primarily seen as a biological entity that could be
separated and destroyed without much ethical consider-
ation. In legal terms, the ownership of unborn Bsurplus
babies^ (unborn babies of families that had already one
child) was transferred from the parents to the state, which
had the authority to enforce abortion and to execute
sanctions if people resisted the policy.
As developments in other jurisdictional domains in
China show, however, this Bcold^ or Bpragmatic^ view
on unborn life forms has not been automatically trans-
ferred to other policy areas. In Chinese patent law, for
instance, a completely different ethical discourse on the
valuation of prenatal human life forms has recently
emerged (Jiang 2016). As Article 9.1.1.2 in Part Two of
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the 2010 Chinese Guidelines for Patent Examination
state: BThe human body at various stages of its formation
and development, including a germ cell, an oosperm, and
embryo and an entire human body, shall not be granted
the patent right.^1 This prohibition to patent unborn
human life or other parts and tissues of human bodies is
explained by a morality clause (in the above guidelines),
which states that: Bwhen the commercial or industrial use
of an invention is unacceptable to the public and not
recognized by common moral standards, a patent right
cannot be granted^ (Jiang 2016).
Hence, in contrast to the Bcold^ logic of disposses-
sion of the population policy (which legitimizes indi-
vidual suffering by promoting the interests of society as
a whole), patent law, and also the law for artificial
reproductive technologies (ART law), and the regula-
tions for hESC research––all emphasize the protection
of interests and rights of individual citizens.
In the context of the donation and transfer of human
embryos and gametes for reproductive purposes (as
defined in ART law) and for research purposes (as
defined in the hESC regulation) both the biological
originators and the embryos (and gametes) themselves
are seen as requiring special protection and are granted
rights that prevent unauthorized removal, irresponsible
use, and commodification.
In light of this conflicting and changing legal situa-
tion, it is extremely difficult to assess the impact of
China’s population policy on the valuation of embryonic
life forms in the context of embryo donation for hESC
research. While we can assume that thirty-five years of
population control have left a mark, one has to be careful
not to overestimate the influence of the population pol-
icy or to confuse official policy positions and discourse
with the opinions and perceptions of ordinary people,
physicians, and scientists. As our empirical findings in
the next sections show, the perceptions and ascribed
value of human embryos are diversified and complex.
For many of our respondents, the donation of human
embryos for research or commercial purposes seems
unthinkable. It seems misleading and wrong to assume
that—as a result of the impact of the one-child policy—
human embryos are generally seen as being of low value
in Chinese society.
Our empirical data suggest that a conflation of the
moral positions embedded in the population policy (in
which prenatal human life has been portrayed as mere
Bbiological matter^ that could be disowned and
destroyed without many ethical concerns) with the atti-
tudes and perceptions of ordinary people is misleading.
As the findings from our study suggest, forms of em-
bryonic life in China are entangled in a rich web of
overlapping and sometimes contradictory layers of
meaning, values, emotions, and social relations, of
which analysts, policymakers, researchers, and clinical
staff should well be aware.
While our survey data and other studies (Jin et al.
2013; Mitzkat, Haimes and Rehmann-Sutter 2010) in-
dicate that this is likely the case for a large proportion of
the general public, this seems especially true for IVF
patients, for whom embryos and gametes are of partic-
ular significance because they embody the hope for a
child after a lengthy and often painful period of infertil-
ity. Indeed, it is a significant shortcoming that bioethics
discourses in China (and many other countries) have for
a long time approached the moral questions and percep-
tions of potential embryo donors as a more abstract
problem, which has been discussed in terms of broader
moral and cultural categories and assumptions, rather
than with regard to the specific context of IVF and the
perceptions of IVF patients. As this article and many
others (Haimes 2008; Scully, Rehmann-Sutter, and Porz
2010) have shown, the valuation of human embryos and
gametes has very particular characteristics in the IVF
clinic. The context of infertility and hope, and also the
technical process of IVF—in which human embryos are
produced outside the human body, become visible
through imaging technology, and are assessed in terms
of their reproductive quality—create specific forms of
valuation, emotions, and affective bonds that differ from
a Bnormal^ pregnancy and that remain unaccounted for
in the context of a hypothetical evaluation of embryo
donation by non-IVF patients.
Findings from the Survey among Students
In this section we will present data from the survey. This
includes both quantitative and qualitative data, the latter
in the form of handwritten comments through which
survey participants could further explain their view-
points. Among the 427 students who returned their
questionnaire, only 48.7 per cent indicated that they
1 Article 5 of patent law, People’s Republic of China, promulgated by
the Standing Committee, National People’s Congress December 27,
2008. http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ details,jsp?id=6511. Accessed
August 1, 2015.
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would agree to the donation of their embryos for hESC
research. Interestingly, among female respondents the
willingness to donate embryos was significantly higher
(52.2 per cent) than among male respondents (44.1 per
cent). Among medical students, on the other hand, the
readiness to donate (49.4 per cent) was only a little
higher than among non-medical students (47.6 per cent).
Of the total number of respondents, 50.8 per cent (48.0
per cent female vs. 54.8 per cent male) said they would
refuse donation and 0.5 per cent remained undecided.
The number of refusers among medical students was
only slightly lower (49.8 per cent) than among non-
medical students (52.4 per cent). It is worthwhile to note
that the percentage of people who refuse to donate their
embryos for hESC research in our survey is lower than
the results from Jin and colleagues’ study on the views
of 363 Chinese IVF couples on the donation of their
frozen Bspare^ embryos (Jin et al. 2013). According to
these authors, 58.8 per cent of all couples preferred to
discard surplus embryos instead of donating them to
research. However, the percentage of refusers in our
survey is higher than the results from a survey study in
the United Kingdom, where 46 per cent of respondents
opted against donation (Scully et al. 2012).
Among the 50.8 per cent (n=217) of the survey’s
respondents who refused donation, the most widely
supported reason was BI do not donate, because using
an embryo is the same as taking a life.^ Of this sub-
group, 57.1 per cent supported this statement. This
statement found more support among male respondents
(61.9 per cent) than among female respondents (53.3 per
cent). Among medical students, support for this claim
(57.8 per cent) was roughly the same as among non-
medical students (56.2 per cent). This is a surprisingly
high percentage, which echoes one of the key com-
plaints against the use of embryos for hESC research
in many Western societies.
While opposition to the use of human embryos is
unlikely to be as pronounced as among the religious right
in the United States, this is nonetheless an interesting
finding because it runs counter to most bioethical claims
in China. It also conflicts with assumptions regarding the
cultural impact of the one-child policy (Mann 2003;
Cookson 2005). The issue was qualified in several of
the survey respondents’ handwritten comments:
To donate an embryo to research is equal to killing
a life. I think life cannot be destroyed casually.
(Student, medicine, female, 25 years)
The embryo is the descendant of me and my wife.
It is an organism and it can’t be killed. (Student,
financial engineering, male, 23 years)
A possible reason for the extensive support for this
statement might be that more than half of all survey
respondents (n=427) indicated that in their view the life
of a human being starts at the initial stages of embryo-
genesis. This stands in sharp contrast to the (assumed)
Confucian-based perception of embryo donors in China,
according to which a large proportion of people
(reportedly) think that human life starts only at the
moment of birth (Qiu 2007; Cong 2008).
In our survey, 51.1 per cent of all respondents replied
to the question Bwhen do you think the life of a human
being starts?^ by selecting the option Bat the moment of
fertilization.^ This viewwas shared among 50.8 per cent
of all female respondents and among 51.4 per cent of all
male respondents. The number of medical students who
endorsed this idea was 54.1 per cent, higher than among
non-medical students, of whom only 46.1 per cent en-
dorsed this statement. Another 37.2 per cent of the total
number of respondents saw the starting point of a human
life at the moment Bwhen a fertilized egg cell has
evolved to an embryo.^ A higher proportion of female
respondents shared this view (40.8 per cent) compared
to male respondents (32.2 per cent). The number of
medical students who supported this statement (35.8
per cent) was slightly lower than among non-medical
students (39.4 per cent).
Altogether only 10.5 per cent of all students consid-
ered the starting point of human life to be situated at a
later moment during gestation: 2.6 per cent opted for
Bthe development of the nervous system^ (2.0 per cent
of all female respondents vs 3.4 per cent of male respon-
dents; and 2.7 per cent of all medical students vs 2.6 per
cent among non-medical students). Of all respondents,
2.3 per cent argued in favour of Bthe development of the
organs^ (2.8 per cent of female respondents vs 1.7 per
cent of male respondents; and 3.1 per cent of all medical
students vs 1.2 per cent of non-medical students). Re-
markably, only 5.6 per cent of all respondents supported
the Confucian perspective that Bthe life of a human
being starts at the moment of birth.^ Of interest is that
male respondents supported this idea to a much higher
degree (10.2 per cent) than female respondents (2.4 per
cent). Also, support among medical and non-medical
students to this statement was significantly different.
While 9.4 per cent of all non-medical students endorsed
Bioethical Inquiry
the view that the life of a human being starts only at the
moment of birth, the idea was supported only by 3.1 per
cent of all medical students. These findings suggest that
medical knowledge on embryogenesis, as well as gen-
dered perspectives, play a significant role in supporting
the idea that human life starts only at birth. While alto-
gether 94.4 per cent of all respondents imagine the
starting point of human life to be at an earlier (prenatal)
stage, it is nevertheless remarkable that more than 10 per
cent of all male respondents supported the idea that life
starts at birth. Oneway to explain why this viewwas only
endorsed by 2.4 per cent of all female respondents is that
the embodied perspective (or imagination) of pregnancy
instils an earlier and closer affective bond towards an
unborn child than is the case with men (and especially
the very young group of male respondents to this survey).
These findings suggest that the view that human life starts
only at birth is much less common in Chinese society
than is often claimed. They also suggest that gendered
perception and the experience of pregnancy, as well as
exposure to more detailed knowledge on what happens
during embryogenesis, are important factors in the
emerging of other viewpoints (at which the starting point
of human life is imagined to be at an earlier stage). More
research into what respondents exactly mean when they
say that a human life starts at birth, or at any other point,
would be required to interpret these data in a way that
makes them relevant for policy decisions. Nevertheless,
the fact that more than 90 per cent of students located the
starting point of life at a much earlier stage than that
which is commonly stated as the normal Chinese bioeth-
ical view is remarkable and requires further investigation.
Another statement that was widely supported among
respondents who refused to donate (n=217; 58 per cent
of all respondents) was: BI do not donate my embryo,
because I am afraid of emotional or psychological
consequences^ (35.9 per cent). This view was shared
among 37.5 per cent of female respondents and 34.0 per
cent of male respondents. Among medical students who
refused donation, this statement was endorsed by 36.7
per cent, compared to 34.8 per cent of non-medical
students who indicated they would reject embryo dona-
tion. Such fears were also reflected in several of the
handwritten comments:
It [embryo donation] may have consequences for
people in a spiritual and psychological sense. Al-
so, it may bring conflicts with morals and ethics.
(Student, Chinese literature, female, 23 years)
It may mentally hurt the person who donates.
(Student, computer science, male, 21 years)
BI do not donate my embryo, because my parents will
probably disagree^ was another relatively widely sup-
ported reason to refuse donation. Of all 217 respondents
who had indicated they would refuse donation, 28.6 per
cent endorsed this statement (50.8 per cent of all 427
survey respondents, as mentioned above). This concern
was shared by 30 per cent of all female respondents and
26.8 per cent of all male respondents who said they
would refuse embryo donation. Among medical stu-
dents who would reject donation, support for this state-
ment was more than 8.0 per cent higher than among
non-medical students: 32.0 per cent among medical
students versus 23.6 per cent of non-medical students.
A slightly higher number of the 217 respondents who
had indicated they would refuse donation of their em-
bryos said they would not donate because their partner
would probably disagree. This statement was supported
by 33.2 per cent of all respondents from this subset of
respondents. Interestingly, the number of men who en-
dorsed this statement (40.2 per cent) was much higher
than among female participants (27.5 per cent). This
indicates that many male respondents in this survey
regarded the needs of their female partners as more
important than their own views. Among the medical
students who would refuse donation, endorsement of
this statement (34.5 per cent) was more or less the same
as among non-medical students (31.5 per cent ). As the
following quotations reveal, numerous respondents
would personally agree to donate their embryos but
would refuse donation due to respect for (and perhaps
also fear of) the opinions of parents, partners, and family
members. Various respondents complained about
Btraditional,^ Bfeudal,^ or Bconservative^ opinions,
and said they would actively try to persuade their par-
ents and/or partner:
My ancestors and parents stick to their feudal
thoughts. I’ll try hard to change their mind. Such
donation can help others as well as ourselves. But
if my parents object strongly, I’ll accept their
opinion and give up. (Student, medicine, male,
20 years)
The embryo is the fruit of love between my hus-
band and me. It is not only life but also the hope of
the family. In its cells are our genes. So, my
parents and forefathers will not agree. If after
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negotiating with my husband we decide to donate
it for medical research, then I’ll try to persuade my
parents and forefathers to accept this. (Student, life
sciences, female, 23 years)
These statements reflect a weighing between
Btraditional^ values on the one hand (as embodied by
the attitudes of the parents and ancestors) and the logic
and needs of Bmodern life^ (as expressed in the desire
for medical progress by many of the younger persons).
Some of the students indicated they would simply ig-
nore the opinion of their parents and donate their em-
bryos to research:
My parents and ancestors are all conservative in
thought, so they may not agree. But if I will insist
on donating, I will stick tomy principles. (Student,
chemistry, male, 24 years)
I think tradition is the obstacle here. As traditional
people, my parents will not agree. I’ll manage the
donation plan myself. (Student, sociology, male,
22 years).
Another interesting finding of the survey was that
81.3 per cent of all respondents (n=427) supported the
statement that Bhuman beings have a soul (linghun) or
spirit (jingshen).^ This view was shared by a consider-
ably higher number of female respondents (85.2 per
cent) compared to male respondents (75.7 per cent ),
as well as a higher proportion of medical students (84.4
per cent) than non-medical students (76.5 per cent ). The
notion that Bthe human embryo has a soul or spirit^ was
supported by 45.2 per cent of all respondents. Again,
female study participants endorsed this statement signif-
icantly more (50.4 per cent ) than their male counterparts
(37.9 per cent), and also among medical students, sup-
port for this view was more than ten percentage points
higher (49.8 per cent) than among non-medical students
(38.2 per cent). Considering that 85.3 per cent (n=398)
of all respondents indicated they have a non-religious
background, these numbers were surprisingly high.
Among respondents with a religious background, how-
ever, the support for the idea that embryos have a spirit/
soul was even higher: 75.9 per cent.2 The idea that
embryos have a spirit/soul was supported by 75.0 per
cent of all female religious respondents and by 77.8 per
cent of all male religious respondents. Among religious
medical students, the support for this notion was 78.3
per cent and more than ten percentage points lower
among religious non-medical students: 66.7 per cent.
Further research would be required to explore how both
Breligious^ and Bnon-religious^ groups conceive of the
notions of Bsoul^ and Bspirit,^ and in which ways these
conceptions influence donation decisions.
The Perspectives of IVF Patients
This section explains the value and significance of
in vitro fertilized embryos for women and couples
undergoing IVF treatment. It shows that IVF em-
bryos are closely entangled with the social, phys-
ical, and emotional perceptions of their biological
originators and wider kinship groups. The section
clarifies, furthermore, that value conceptions of
embryos and attitudes regarding research use are
intimately shaped by the experience of infertility,
the emotional pressures that emerge in the context
of the infertility treatment, and the specific condi-
tions through which embryos are created, stored,
and applied in the IVF clinic. Perceptions of IVF
embryos and embryo donation can undergo impor-
tant changes in relation to classifications of the
embryos’ Bquality,^ the state and location of embryos
(fresh in a Petri dish or cryopreserved in a freezer tank),
and reproductive success (i.e. before and after a success-
ful pregnancy).
The Value of IVF Embryos in the Context of Infertility
Value conceptions of IVF embryos are influenced by the
experience of infertility and related sociocultural pres-
sures to give birth to a child. For persons undergoing
infertility treatment, the in-vitro-generated embryo sig-
nifies a source of profound hope and value. It constitutes
a form of Breproductive capital^ that, after the experi-
ence and diagnosis of infertility, render a long-cherished
but repeatedly discouraged dream back into the realm of
the achievable:
We had waited long for a baby. At the beginning
of our marriage already we started to discuss our
baby’s name. But then I felt disappointed. Then
when the embryos were created in the laboratory
and stored in the [nitrogen] tank, I started to
think—these embryos are my hope, my hope for
2 Altogether, twenty-nine students indicated having religious back-
grounds: eleven Buddhist; five Christian; one Muslim; twelve other.
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a child, my hope for the future. (Female IVF
patient, 30 years)
The IVF embryos form a scarce and precious sub-
stance that is embedded in a network of emotional,
physical, and kinship relations. With their potential to
reverse personal and collective suffering, they epitomize
a pinnacle of hope for a better and happier future:
I have been worried for a period of five years now,
and during this period I always felt stressed and
anxious and kind of blue and depressed in my
heart. Also, I felt not so energetic. But now, where
I know that I have this tiny baby in my body, I feel
everything is so bright, and the future is also bright
and my parents and the whole family will be
happy for me. (Female IVF patient, 29 years)
While it can be argued that such expressions of joy
characterize the experience of (successful) IVF patients
everywhere, in the sociocultural fabric of China such
emotions are intensified by the following factor. First, in
the patriarchal and patrilineal tradition of Chinese soci-
ety, it has been a central moral obligation for sons to
carry on the family line, an attitude that is influential
also in the present (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005).
Moreover, as IVF patients and clinicians have repeated-
ly stressed in interviews, even today infertility is widely
regarded as a form of personal failure. Infertility and
childlessness, therefore, are often paralleled by feelings
of shame and fear of stigma. Such anxieties exist in
particular in rural areas, where infertility becomes a
public issue sooner or later:
To have a child is like your destiny. If you have a
baby, then that is your parents’ contribution, your
parents’ achievement. But if you have no child,
maybe the gods have punished you. Maybe the
neighbourhood will blame the parents: Bthey must
have done some bad things; that is why their
children can have no baby.^ (Mid-career IVF cli-
nician 1)
Infertility is explained here from within the beliefs of
folk cosmologies, which can give rise to painful accu-
sations and stigmatization of the infertile couple and
their parents. Whilst the case may be extreme, it shows
that couples’ efforts to give birth to a child are
underpinned by strong normative pressures. This situa-
tion is likely to have a significant impact on attitudes to
the donation of IVF embryos.
Differentiating Quality/Stratifying Value
Despite the significance of IVF embryos for patients, in
the course of the infertility treatment the conceptions
and feelings of IVF patients regarding their embryos are
subjected to changes. In the IVF clinic, patients are
exposed to new forms of expertise and explanations
and their embryos are subjected to the rigorous testing
of quality, morphology, and reproductive viability. In
other words, during their treatments patients learn to
think about the characteristics and value of their embry-
os through the technical categories and quality parame-
ters of the IVF space. Most importantly, embryos are
ranked through a classification system that defines their
reproductive value on a continuum from Bgood^ to
Bbad.^ This process consigns IVF embryos to various
destinies. Those of the highest quality group are usually
transferred directly into the uterus (so-called Bfresh em-
bryo transfer^ which offers the highest likelihood for a
pregnancy). Often, however, more Bhigh-quality^ em-
bryos are produced than can be transferred into the
uterus at one time. In this case, these embryos are stored
and frozen in tanks of liquid nitrogen for future use,
together with the embryos of lower-quality groups. Em-
bryos whose reproductive potentiality is judged low,
unpredictable, or absent are classified as Bwaste.^ This
limits the future use of these embryos to two possibili-
ties: disposal or (provided researchers are interested in
these Blow-quality^ embryos) donation to the research
lab. The fact that IVF embryos are frozen in tanks of
liquid nitrogen constitutes a source of concern for many
potential parents:
I am so afraid that the freezing will damage the
quality of my embryos. You know, before freezing
the quality of my embryos was very good—first
grade. (Female IVF patient, 32 years)
I hope so much that these embryos have a good
quality and that they can make it and I will have
success. (IVF patient 31 years)
Hence, in the course of the IVF treatment, patients
learn to think about their embryos within a new set of
vocabulary and parameters. These factors play an im-
portant role in the shaping of attitudes toward embryo
donation. The restructuring of ideas, attitudes, and men-
tal images of patients’ embryos in terms of categories of
reproductive viability clearly facilitates the attempts of
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clinicians or stem cell researchers to motivate IVF pa-
tients to donate their spare embryos for research. At the
start of their treatment, IVF patients attribute equal value
to their embryos. However, once the IVF embryos are
produced and assessed in the clinics, some embryos are
labelled as being of lower reproductive value than
others. This stratification has an important effect. The
privileging of Bhigh-quality embryos^ in the context of
IVF is accompanied by the consistent devaluation of the
category of the Bpoor-quality embryos,^ which are then
defined as Bdisposable^ or Bwaste.^ As Cussins has
pointed out, this rhetoric of stratified value justifies the
exemption of the Blow-quality^ embryo from Bthe moral
and legal standards that apply to embryos as potential
sources of life^ (Cussins 1998, 186). Without this step,
the removal of these tissues or their donation for re-
search would bemore difficult to legitimize. It should be
noted, though, that from a biological perspective, the
argumentative pillars onwhich this Bexemption ofmoral
and legal standards^ is based are not entirely stable. As
Chen et al. have shown through their work with
declassified embryos, classifications of embryos
as Bwaste^ are never absolute indications. Some
of these embryos still have a substantial reproduc-
tive potentiality and could result in a successful
pregnancy. Because these embryos’ pregnancy rate
is not as elevated, however, as that of the higher-
graded embryos, their usage in the IVF clinic is
banned (Chen et al. 2005). For hESC researchers,
these Bpoor-quality^ embryos can still form a valu-
able resource, an indication that reveals the ambiv-
alence and multi-layeredness of value conceptions
of embryos. It is important, in this respect, also that the
stratified value conceptions of the IVF clinic can conflict
with culturally transmitted beliefs and social norms, for
which differences in quality are irrelevant. This will be
discussed further below.
The IVF Embryo as Emotional Object
The emerging of emotional bonds on the part of IVF
patients toward their embryos is not a linear process and
is experienced differently at different stages. Most of the
women with whom I spoke said they would not build an
emotional bond with embryos that were defined as Blow
quality.^ None of these persons considered the
discarding of these embryos as a problem, a situation
that clearly facilitates the donation of these embryos for
research.
I knew before that this situation will emerge …
that there will be many embryos, and that not all
can be used. I know this consequence, and I con-
sider this as a part of the treatment. (Female IVF
patient, 28 years)
Embryos that were defined as Bhigh quality,^ on the
other hand, were typically much valued, and some
women reported that strong affective ties could emerge
toward their frozen embryos over time. During a first
IVF cycle, when a couple’s Bfresh embryos^ were
transplanted, emotional ties with the frozen embryos
were reported to be low:
In my mind, these frozen embryos are only very
tiny, tiny round things—little stuff there. Because
it is not in my body I think it is just some cells. I
cannot say that I have a special emotion to it.
(Female IVF patient, 31 years)
In my body, the contact with the embryo is stron-
ger and the emotion is stronger. (Female IVF
patient, 30 years)
These testimonies suggest that emotional bonds toward
IVF embryos build up in a gradual process. Due to the
spatial distance and the uncertainty whether the frozen
embryos will Bsurvive^ or Bmaintain their good quality,^
women seem first of all to avoid building up a stronger
emotional attachment to these tissues. However, this
should not be misread as indifference. Rather, it may form
a kind of self-protection. Virtually all patients experienced
anxieties about these embryos, and almost unanimously
they hoped that Bthey are kept safe there^ and that the
Bdoctors will take good care of them.^ Our data show that,
if the initial IVF cycle with Bfresh embryos^ was unsuc-
cessful, the feelings and ideas of IVF patients toward their
frozen embryos changed. A female patient told us that after
her first unsuccessful IVF cycle, she started to imagine of
her frozen embryos as Bvery little children^ of which she
hoped that Bthey have it good out there^ and that they are
Bwell protected so that they cannot be stolen and used for a
pregnancy by another couple.^ These findings indicate the
likelihood of important changes in attitudes towards em-
bryo donation as the IVF process proceeds.
Emotional bonds with the embryos in the nitrogen
tanks can also last, or, as the following example shows,
even intensify—once a pregnancy has been successfully
initiated. These bonds can prevent the willingness of
women to donate their embryos. The following excerpt
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is from a female IVF patient who—just before we met
her—had heard that she had become pregnant:
I want to keep my [frozen] embryos for a long
time. I really cannot consider giving them away
now. Maybe later, when my child is four or five
years old… but also after five years I would not
like to give them away all. I still would like to
keep some. (Female IVF patient, 29 years)
Perhaps because her IVF embryos had now proved
their reproductive viability, this woman felt an intensive
emotional attachment toward her frozen embryos. The
donation of these embryos for research or disposal was, at
least at the moment we spoke to her, considered unthink-
able. Other women may feel less intense attachment and
be more willing to donate their spare embryos for re-
search. However, the idea that the frozen embryos should
be kept for some years was widespread. The most fre-
quent reason was that during or after pregnancy some-
thing might happen and that further embryos would be
needed. The frozen embryos, from this perspective, con-
stitute an important Breserve reproductive capital,^ a
source of value on which one can rely when really
needed. Together, these findings show that detailed
knowledge on the (changing) meanings and value con-
ceptions of embryos during the IVF treatment is of high
relevance to understanding the ways in which attitudes
towards embryo donation are shaped in the context of
IVF. This insight has not yet been fully explored in policy
discussions about the use of embryos for research.
The Embryo as Part of the Family and Kinship Group
A final aspect that should be highlighted addresses
assumptions about the entwinement of IVF embryos in
the web of social, bodily, and emotional relations of the
family and wider kinship group. To whom the embryo
belongs is an ambiguous matter, and among a certain
segment of potential embryo donors in China the opin-
ions of family members seem to play an important role
in decision-making processes:
Such a decision [to donate the embryo] must be
discussed with the family as a whole, and the opin-
ions of the others must be respected. If there is a
member who disagrees, I will think about this. But it
really depends on the attitude of this person. If his or
her opinion is very strong, meaning opposing
donation very strongly, I would not donate. I do
not want to hurt the relationship between family
members just because of donation. (Female IVF
patient, 32 years)
Such patterns of inter-familial respect and obligations
appear to be closely intertwined with culturally mediat-
ed conceptions of the human body and notions of phys-
ical interrelatedness between the generations. As one of
the IVF clinicians I interviewed explained it:
You know, inChinese cultural tradition people regard
their bodies as coming from their parents, and it is
seen as very precious, so we have to take good care
of our bodies; we cannot give any part of it to others.
So, in the Chinese tradition it is forbidden to give
away… to donate your tissues or organs to others,
including your cells, your gametes, which include
oocytes and sperm. Therefore, [many] people cannot
agree if their embryos shall be used for research.
I: What would happen if someone believes in
these ideas but would still donate?
This would be an activity that means that you do
not respect your parents. Your parents gave you
your hair, your body, your organs, this … the
whole of you. The parents gave this to you and
you did not take good care of it, you gave parts of
it to others. So, you don’t respect your parents.
From this perspective, donation of embryos without
prior consent of the donors’ parents forms an obvious
violation of culturally mediated social norms and repre-
sents a serious act of disrespect and disloyalty. This way
of thinking is reflected also in a larger number of hand-
written comments of survey respondents:
From a Chinese traditional point of view Bwe get
our bodies from our parents,^ so we can’t give it
away casually, not to mention a new life. (Student,
medicine, female, 25 years)
The traditional concepts tell us it is unsuitable to
donate the embryo. I’ll give up the donation for
the principle of filial piety. (Student, accountancy,
male, 24 years)
Conclusion
The findings in this article indicate once again the im-
portance of donor-centred perspectives in bioethical
debates on the use of human embryos and oocytes for
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research. Such research sheds light on the subjective,
embodied, and emotionally charged perspectives of the
women and couples who are confronted with the deci-
sion to give away parts of their bodies and on the wider
socio-economic, political, and institutional contexts in
which these exchanges take place. This also provides a
basis for a clearer assessment of the psychological im-
pact of donation processes and of the disruptive poten-
tial of the transfer of reproductive tissues and human
genetic materials at the level of the family and wider
community. Equally important, empirical evidence can
play a crucial role in deconstructing politicized forms of
bioethical argumentation and the often-ill-informed as-
sumptions about Bothers^ that inform socio-ethical de-
bates on the impact and moral dilemmas of technology
developments in the life sciences. The article has illus-
trated, in this regard, that Confucian-inspired ideas that a
person comes into existence only at the moment of birth
do not correspond to the ideas of the overwhelming
majority of research participants in this study. This is
of interest because this claim has played an important
role in legitimizing hESC research in China and in
preventing a more detailed and empirically informed
exploration of public opinions. The research illustrates,
furthermore, that claims cannot be upheld that ethical
concerns regarding the donation and use of embryos for
hESC research are something typical for Western soci-
eties but absent in China. The decision-making process
for the contribution of supernumerary IVF embryos to
research is, at least for the majority of participants in this
study, characterized by careful normative reflections on
the nature and value of these human biological resources
and by an introspective assessment of the psychological
and emotional consequences of the act of donation, as
well as of its permissibility in the light of intergenera-
tional patterns of obligation. While it is true that the
study sample in this study is too small to derive valid
conclusions at a more general level, it seems nonetheless
justified to say that the Confucian-inspired notion that
the life of a human being starts only at the moment of
birth does not correlate with the perceptions of large
numbers of Chinese IVF patients. This notion falls short
in accounting for the rich plethora of meanings and
needs put forward by the participants of this study.
Equally problematic appear assumptions that the value
of unborn human life is generally regarded as low in
China, as a result of the high number of abortions carried
out in the one-child policy. Three decades of the one-child
policy have clearly contributed to the devaluation of
unborn forms of human life, especially at the level of state
discourse and probably also within wider society. As we
have shown elsewhere (Jiang and Rosemann 2018), dis-
courses on the valuation of human embryos and fetuses
differ widely across legal domains and are undergoing
important changes. In patent law, ART law, and the regu-
lation for hESC research, human gametes, embryos, and
their biological originators have been defined as requiring
special protection and are granted rights that prevent un-
authorized removal, irresponsible use, and commodifica-
tion (Jiang and Rosemann 2018). Our empirical data here
suggest that a conflation of the moral positions embedded
in the population policy (in which prenatal human life has
been portrayed as mere Bbiological matter^ that could be
disowned and destroyed without much ethical concern)
with the attitudes and perceptions of ordinary people is
misleading. As the findings from our study suggest, forms
of embryonic life in China are entangled in a rich web of
overlapping and sometimes contradictory layers of mean-
ing, value, emotions, and social relations, of which ana-
lysts, policymakers, researchers, and clinical staff should
well be aware.While our survey data and other studies (Jin
et al. 2013; Mitzkat, Haimes, and Rehmann-Sutter 2010)
indicate that this is likely the case for a large proportion of
the general public, this seems especially true for IVF
patients, for whom embryos and gametes are of particular
significance, because they embody the hope for a child
after a lengthy and often painful period of infertility.
It is a significant shortcoming that bioethics discourses
in China and in many other countries have for a long time
approached the moral questions of embryo donation as a
more abstract problem, which has been discussed in
terms of broader moral and cultural categories and as-
sumptions, rather than with regard to the specific context
of IVF and the perceptions of IVF patients. As this article
and others (Haimes 2008; Scully, Rehmann-Sutter, and
Porz 2010) have shown, the valuation of human embryos
and gametes has very particular characteristics in the IVF
clinic. The context of infertility, strong hopes, and the
technical process of IVF create specific forms of valua-
tion and affection that differ from a Bnormal^ pregnancy.
These embodied and situated perceptions remain unac-
counted for in the context of a hypothetical evaluation of
embryo donation by non-IVF patients.
However, the findings of this study should not conceal
that for approximately half of our survey respondents and
IVF patients the donation of embryos for hESC seems not
to constitute a problem. This is roughly the same percent-
age as reported from studies on embryo donation in
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various European countries (Haimes et al. 2008; Svendson
and Koch 2008; Scully et al. 2012). As our data have
shown, these persons do not expect emotional problems
or ethical conflicts, and they have embraced the idea that
their leftover embryos can be used for research and poten-
tially the development of newmedical treatments. It is also
important to note that for many IVF patients and couples
who have indicated a refusal to donate, the reasons for
refusal are of a more pragmatic nature rather than fears of
violating local cultural norms or the expectation of emo-
tional or psychological conflict. The wish to keep embryos
beyond the birth of a child can, for instance, also be seen as
an Binsurance policy^ for IVF patients. As indicated by
several of our interview partners, if a child becomes seri-
ously ill and dies at an early age, there will still be spare
embryos available that could be used to create another
child without going through a complete IVF cycle once
again, possibly even at an age when a woman’s own
oocytes are no longer viable for pregnancy. A closely
related point is that with the gradual relaxation of the
one-child policy during the last years, many couples were
literally (cyro-)banking on a change in China’s birth poli-
tics. Indeed, the transition from a one-child to a two-child
policy on 1 January 2016 rendered large numbers of
(frozen) embryos legally available for thousands of cou-
ples to have a second child (Wahlberg 2016). The fact that
frozen IVF embryos are often seen as a sort of Breserve
reproductive capital^ that is valuable for IVF couples, even
after their initial reproductive wish is fulfilled, is well
documented in our interviews and also other studies from
a US–European context (Haimes and Taylor 2009;
Goswami, Murdoch, and Haimes 2015). However, the
specific legal and regulatory context of China has impacted
on embryo valuation and donation in a specific way.
Surprisingly enough, despite their significance, many of
these insights and the viewpoints and perspectives of IVF
patients (as the actual donors of human embryos for re-
search) have rarely been heard in ethical debates on hESC,
neither in China nor in many other countries.
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